State v. McKean Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41004 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-20-2014
State v. McKean Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41004
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. McKean Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41004" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5237.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5237
l' 1-"~.\,/ 
, J 
\:\.j":, '\~/J !. • iJ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SHANNON MARIE MCKEAN, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 41004 
CANYON CO. NO. CR 2012-21064 & 
2012-14826 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6406 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 5 
I. The District Court Erred By Concluding That AM-2201 Was A 
Controlled Substance As A Matter Of Law ............................................................ 5 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................................................... 5 
C. The District Court Erred By Concluding That AM-2201 Was A 
Controlled Substance As A Matter Of Law ...................................................... 6 
II. The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence That Ms. McKean 
Relied On Reports Indicated That The Substances Were Not 
Synthetic Cannabinoids ...................................................................................... 12 
A. Introduction .................................................................................................... 12 
B. Standard Or Review ...................................................................................... 13 
C. The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence That Ms. McKean 
Relied on Reports Indicated That The Substances Were Not 
Synthetic Cannabinoids ................................................................................. 13 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. Alley, 318 P.3d 962 (2014) ............................................................. passim 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641 (Ct.App.2001) ....................................................... 5 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 327 (1999) ............................................................ 16, 19 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654 (1999) ............................................................... 5 
State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846 (Ct.App.1998) ...................................................... 6 
State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387 (Ct.App.2000) .................................................... 5 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993) ............................................................... 16, 19 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 ( 1989) ............................................................... 18 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758 ( 1993) ...................................................... 13 
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502 (Ct.App.2003) ....................................................... 5 
State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200 (2006) .................................................................. 18 
State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538 (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................... 18 
State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................ 16, 19 
State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628 (1999) .......................................................... 13 
State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174 (1998) ................................................................ 19 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471 (2007) ............................................................. 5 
Statutes 
I.C. § 37-2705 ............................................................................................ passim 
Rules 
IRE 403 ......................................................................................................... 13, 18 
ii 
Additional Authorities 
McCormick on Evidence§ 249 (John W. Strong ed., 5th. Ed.1999) ................... 18 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shannon Marie McKean appeals from her judgment of conviction for two counts 
of delivery of a controlled substance and five counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver. Ms. McKean was found guilty following a jury trial 
and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two years 
fixed. Ms. McKean now appeals, and she asserts that the district court erred by 
determining that AM-2201 was a controlled substance as a matter of law and by 
excluding evidence that she relied on lab reports on the substances she purchased 
because they were relevant to demonstrate the effect on the listener. Ms. McKean 
asserts that the recent opinion by the Court of Appeals in State v. Alley, 318 P.3d 962 
(2014) controls the first issue and that the district court erred by determining that the lab 
reports only demonstrated a mistake of law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 3, 2012, Charles Gentry, a Deputy Canyon County Sheriff with the 
Narcotic Unit visited a shop called Smoke Effects in an undercover capacity. (Tr., Vol. 
II, p.176, L.15-p.182, L.9.) Wesley Reed, Troy Harrell, and Ms. McKean were present 
in the store that day. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.182, Ls.20-25.) He purchased a small bag of Fire N' 
Ice for $12.76. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.185, L.16 - p.186, L.25.) This product subsequently 
tested positiveforJWH-122/210. (Tr., Vol. II, p.360, Ls.1-2.) OnMay21,2012, Deputy 
Gentry again visited the shop and purchased another bag of Fire N' Ice. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.190, Ls.11-14.) This product subsequently tested positive for JWH-210. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.361, Ls.9-12.) 
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On June 6, 2012, Deputy Gentry conducted a search at Ms. McKean's and 
Mr. Harrell's residence. (Tr., Vol. II, p.195, Ls.13-15.) He collected 91 bags of "Scooby 
Snax" at the residence. (Tr., Vol. II, p.203, Ls.3-5.) This product tested positive for AM-
2201. (Tr., Vol. II, p.364, Ls.8-14.) Officer Eldridge from the Caldwell City Police 
collected bags of Fire N' Ice, Mad Hatter, AK-47, and Down 2 Earth from Smoke Effects 
that same day. (Tr., Vol. II, p.257, L.22 - p.259, L.3.) These products tested positive 
for JWH-210/122, AM-2201, AM-2201, and AM-2201, respectively. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.360, 
Ls.1-2, p. 363, Ls.5-8, p.362, Ls.9-11, p.363, Ls.15-25.) 
In CR 2012-14826, Ms. McKean was charged with two counts of delivery of a 
controlled substance by aiding and abetting another to deliver Fire N' Ice, a Schedule I 
non-narcotic synthetic drug equivalent to Tetrahydrocannabinol or Cannibis. (R., pp.14-
15.) She was alleged to have aided delivery to Deputy Gentry on May 3 and May 21, 
2012. (R., pp.14-15.) 
In CR 2012-21064-C, Ms. McKean was charged with five counts of possession 
of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., p.79.)1 These charges were for four counts of possession of AM-
2201 (AK-47, Mad Hatter, Scooby Snax, and Down 2 Earth) and one count of 
possession of JWH-210 (Fire N' Ice). (R., pp.79-81.) The cases were consolidated 
without objection. (R., p .104.) 
Ms. McKean did not dispute that she possessed the items or sold the items at the 
store. (Tr., Vol. 11, p., 139 L.20 - p.140, L.15.) Rather, her defense was that she did not 
know that she possessed synthetic cannabinoids. (Tr., Vol. II, p.140, Ls.10-15.) At trial, 
Ms. McKean informed the jury that she would introduce evidence that she based her 
1 Ms. McKean was found not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.398.) 
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reliance on lab reports she received from the companies from which she purchased the 
substances. (Tr., Vol. II, p.144, Ls.16-20.) The district court prohibited Ms. McKean 
from introducing this evidence. (Tr.,Vol. II, p.167, L.4 - p.168, L.4.) 
Also, prior to trial, the State filed a motion for judicial ruling that JWH-210, JWH-
122, and AM-2201 were controlled substances. (R., p.107.) Ms. McKean did not 
dispute that JWH-210 and JWH-122 were controlled substances, but did dispute that 
AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (See R., p.140.) The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing in which an expert witness testified for each party. Following that 
hearing, the district court held that, "AM-2201 is a controlled substance that falls within 
Idaho Code 37-2705(30)." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.211, Ls.10-13.) The court instructed the jury 
as such. (R., p.381.) 
Ms. McKean was convicted at trial and the district court imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and the court suspended the 
sentences and placed Ms. McKean on probation. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.551, L.21 - p.552, L.9.) 
Ms. McKean appeals. (R., p.420.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by concluding that AM-2201 was a controlled substance 
as a matter of law? 
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence that Ms. McKean relied on reports 
indicating that the substances were not synthetic cannabinoids? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Concluding That AM-2201 Was A Controlled Substance As 
A Matter Of Law 
A. Introduction 
Ms. McKean asserts that the district court erred when it determined that AM-2201 
was a controlled substance as a matter of law. Whether AM-2201 is a controlled 
substance is a question of fact for the jury, and because Ms. McKean was precluded 
from presenting this defense, her convictions must be vacated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct.App.2003). The language of the 
statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 
Idaho 654, 659 (1999). If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion 
for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. State v. 
Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct.App.2000). When this Court must engage in statutory 
construction because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative 
intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct.App.2001 ). 
Not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those 
words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent 
upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation that will not render it a 
nullity. Id. A court must also give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute if 
possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 
Idaho 471, 475 (2007). If, after examining the legislative history, a criminal statute is 
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still ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the statute must be construed in favor of 
the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846,848 (Ct.App.1998). 
C. The District Court Erred By Concluding That AM-2201 Was A Controlled 
Substance As A Matter Of Law 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion for judicial ruling, seeking a ruling that that 
JWH-210, JWH-122, and AM-2201 were controlled substances, and, "to preclude the 
defense from presenting evidence and argument to the jury disputing that JWH-210, 
JWH-122, and AM-2201 are controlled substances." {R., p.107.) Ms. McKean did not 
dispute that JWH-210 and JWH-122 were controlled substances; the dispute in this 
case centers solely on AM-2201. (See R., p.140.) The district court held an evidentiary 
hearing in which expert witnesses testified for each party. Following that hearing, the 
district court held that, "AM-2201 is a controlled substance that falls within Idaho Code 
37-2705(30)." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.211, Ls.10-13.) The district court erred. 
The Court of Appeals addressed this precise issued very recently in State v. 
Alley, 318 P.3d 962 (2014).2 Like the defendant in Alley, Ms. McKean was charged with 
a violation of former I.C. § 37-2705(d), which then defined schedule I controlled 
substances to include the following chemicals:3 
2 The State submitted the district court's memorandum decision in Alley in support of its 
motion in this case. (R., p.111.) 
3 The Court of Appeals noted, 
The version of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) in effect when Alley was 
charged was recently amended. See 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 181. 
The statute is now found at I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31 )(ii) and the disputed 
language "by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-
morpholinyl)ethyl" and similar language in subsections (ii}(a)-(f) has been 
replaced with "to any extent." Alley concedes that the new statutory 
language includes AM-2201 as a schedule I controlled substance. 
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(30) T etrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. 
and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar 
chemical structure such as the following: 
i. Tetrahydrocannabinols: 
ii. The following synthetic drugs: 
a. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole ... by 
substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, 
cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not 
further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not 
substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent. 
I.C. § 37-2705(d); see also Alley, 318 P.3d at _.4 
In Alley, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties agreed that "AM-2201 is a 
compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole by substitution at the 
nitrogen atom of the indole ring, but they presented divergent evidence concerning the 
meaning of the word "alkyl" and whether AM-2201 is derived by a substitution by an 
alkyl." Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court 
was presented with conflicting testimony on the meaning of the term, "alkyl" and, 
therefore, held that the term was ambiguous. Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The Court of 
Appeals then concluded that the legislative history did not make the term clear. Alley, 
318 P.3d at_. Therefore, the Court of Appeals applied the rule of lenity, interpreted 
the term, "alkyl" narrowly to exclude alkyl halides, or haloalkyls, and concluded that, 
Alley, 318 P.3d at_. Ms. McKean was charged with a violation of the statute as it read 
at the time Mr. Alley was charged. 
4 As of the writing of this brief, only the Pacific Reporter citation is available for Alley. 
The pinpoint cites are not yet available. 
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"AM-2201 is not included in the enumerated examples listed in I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(a)." Alley, 318 P.3d at_. 
The Court of Appeals then considered, "whether [AM-2201] may be 
encompassed within another portion of subsection (d)(30). The latter portion of 
subsection (d)(30) covers 'synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with 
similar chemical structure such as the following,' after which nonexclusive lists of 
example substances are provided in subparts (i) and (ii)". Alley, 318 P .3d at _. The 
court determined, "[i]t follows that AM-2201 is prohibited by I.C. § 37-2705(d) if it has a 
chemical structure similar to one of the chemicals listed thereunder. Alley, 318 P.3d at 
_. The Court of Appeals held that, "[w]hether AM-2201 has a similar chemical 
structure to one of the example substances listed under the statute is a question of 
fact." Alley, 318 P.3d at_. "This is a jury question bearing on the general issue of 
Alley's guilt or innocence that cannot be disposed of in a pretrial motion." Alley, 318 
P.3d at_. Because the Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Alley's pretrial motion 
to dismiss was procedurally improper, it ultimately affirmed the district court despite 
disagreeing with the court's interpretation of I.C. § 37-2705(d). Alley, 318 P.3d at_. 
In Alley, the Court of Appeals summarized the definition of an alkyl: 
the term "alkyl" includes, at a minimum, a "straight chain or a branched 
saturated chain hydrocarbon." In this sense, "alkyl" refers to a functional 
group that is composed solely of hydrogen and carbon atoms, has no 
double or triple bonds, and does not form a ring shape. The relevant 
functional group in AM-2201 is fluoropentyl. This functional group has no 
double bonds and does not form a ring shape. However, fluoropentyl is 
not a "hydrocarbon" because it contains a single fluorine atom. Because of 
the fluorine atom, the parties agree that fluoropentyl is an alkyl halide, 
which is also commonly referred to as a haloalkyl. A halide refers to the 
presence of a halogen and halogens are a category of elements that 
include fluorine. 
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Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The dispute in Alley, as it was here, was whether "alkyl" could 
be read to include "alkyl halides." Alley, 318 P.3d at_. (See also Tr., p, Vol. I, p.81, 
Ls.17-21 ("Q. And so is the disagreement, then, whether alkyl is a general term that 
necessarily includes haloalkyl? A. True.")) 
Like in Alley, the district court in this case was confronted with differing 
interpretations of the term, alkyl. In Alley, the State's expert testified that, 
he considered the language used in the foreign statute to be sufficiently 
broad because, in his view, the term "alkyl" includes alkyl halides with 
regard to naming the component structures. He believed that describing 
the "backbone structure" of a functional group was sufficient to describe 
the group or class a chemical fell within. This was based on his review of 
several textbooks and the IUPAC standards, which state that naming 
organic compounds starts with naming the parent structure, which is then 
modified to indicate the precise structural change required to generate the 
compound from the parent structure. While he conceded that fluoropentyl 
would have distinct chemical properties, he argued its "backbone 
structure" is pentyl, an alkyl. Accordingly, it was his opinion that AM-2201 
is a chemical that falls within the examples enumerated in I.C. § 37-
2705( d)(30 )(ii)( a). 
Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The State's expert testified much the same way: Corinna 
Owsley also testified that naming organic compounds begins with naming the parent 
structure and then modified to indicate the "addition of the prefix or whatever halogen 
you have." (Tr., Vol. I, p.67, Ls.9-13.) She testified that a "haloalkyl is named by the 
base parent alkyl." (Tr., Vol. I, p.67, Ls.9-12.) Because of this, she testified that a 
haloalkyl would be described by the "umbrella term alkyl." (Tr., Vol. I, p.67, Ls.1-6.) 
Because of this, she testified that a haloalkyl "was intended to be included with the alkyl 
groups." (Tr., Vol. I, p.61, Ls.6-9.) 
Ms. McKean's expert witness, Dr. Owen McDougal, also testified in the Alley 
case. As the Court of Appeals noted, Dr. McDougal, 
testified for the defense that the term "alkyl" excluded alkyl halides. He 
said that the term "alkyl" refers exclusively to a straight chain hydrocarbon 
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with no double or triple bonds. He said this was consistent with the 
standardized IUPAC [International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry] 
definitions. Because the term "alkyl" excludes alkyl halides, according to 
Dr. McDougal, AM-2201 would not fall within the enumerated examples in 
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). 
Alley, 318 P.3d at_. 
Just as he did in Mr. Alley's case, here Dr. McDougal testified that the term, 
"alkyl" excludes alkyl halides: 
From the context of how you would define an alkyl group and in the 
presence of additional heteroatoms, whether that would still be an alkyl or 
not, the definition of the alkyl in Morrison and Boyd fifth edition is pretty 
clear on it ... where it is a derivative of an alkane minus one hydrogen 
atom. The inclusion of heteroatoms alters the definition of what 
you're dealing with, and a haloalkyl being distinctly different from an 
alkyl. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.165, Ls.4-14 (emphasis added.)) Dr. McDougal testified that AM-2201 was 
not an alkyl and not covered by the 2011 version of I.C. § 37-2705(d) because "AM-
2201 is a haloalkyl attached to the nitrogen. That's clear as can be." (Tr., Vol. I, p.162, 
Ls.15-19.) He specifically disagreed with Ms. Owsley on this point. (Tr., Vol. I, p.165, 
Ls.1-14.) Thus, just an in Alley, the district court in this case heard divergent evidence 
on the definition of the term, alkyl. 
In this case, the district court noted that the primary dispute was whether the 
term alkyl encompassed haloalkyls, but the court found, 
that that is irrelevant, for purposes of this discussion. Because whether it 
is an alkyl or whether it is a haloalkyl merely broadens or narrows the 
examples of kinds of substances that the legislature intends and passed to 
be controlled substances. 
And so whether it is an alkyl or a haloalkyl does not determine whether or 
not it is a controlled substance. It is a controlled substance because the 
lists of parent structures and substitutions are merely examples of the 
kinds of things that could be controlled substances. And so the Court 
finds that the statute is unambiguous, and that "such as "merely gives a 
list of examples, that it does not limit the statute to those substances 
listed. 
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To the extent that the parties believe that "such as" is to be read 
differently, so as to limit, then the Court finds that the statute becomes 
potentially ambiguous, and we have competing principles. We have one 
giving the legislative intent of the legislature deference, as well as any 
anbiguities tend to be read in favor of the Defendant. 
I don't think those are necessarily competing, because in statutory 
construction, if it is ambiguous, you first look to the intent of the legislature. 
And the intent of the legislature, as contained in the exhibits, is to cut as 
broad a swath, or to create as broad a category as it could to prohibit and 
limit controlled substances that were the synthetic equivalents of 
tetrahydrocannabinoids (sic). 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.209, L.15-p.211, L.2.) 
The district court erred. In light of Alley, it is relevant whether an alkyl 
encompasses a haloalkyl because this determines whether AM-2201 is an enumerated 
example listed in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Alley, 318 P.3d at_. As the Court of 
Appeals has already determined, AM-2201 is not. Id. Further, whether AM-2201 has a 
similar chemical structure to one of the example substances listed under I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30) is a question of fact to be determined by the jury and is not determined by 
whether the legislature intended to create as broad a category as possible. Alley, 318 
P.3d at_. Because this is a question of fact, the district court erred by determining 
that the AM-2201, was, as a matter of law, a controlled substance pursuant to the 2011 
version of I.C. § 37-2705(d). 
As a result of the district court's holding, Ms. McKean was precluding from 
presenting evidence or argument that AM-2201 was not a controlled substance. The 
jury was instructed that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (R., p.381.) Pursuant to 
Alley, this is error. 
Ms. McKean submits that this error requires all of her convictions to be vacated. 
All of Ms. McKean's convictions relating to AM-2201, Counts 11-V in CR 2012-21064, are 
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obviously effected by this error because she was prohibited from asserting that AM-
2201 was not a controlled substance. 
Ms. McKean also asserts that her convictions for the non-AM-2201 convictions, 
relating to Fire N' Ice, must also be vacated. Again, Alley provides guidance. In Alley, 
the defendant was charged in a single count with possessing three substances: JWH-
019, JWH-201, and AM-2201. Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The State asserted that the 
appeal was moot because Mr. Alley admitted that he violate I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) 
irrespective of any determination that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. Alley, 318 
P.3d at_. However, the Court of Appeals determined that a holding that AM-2201 
was not a controlled substance could give Mr. Alley a mistake of fact defense, namely 
that he only intended to possess AM-2201, negating the mens rea required for 
possession of the other substances. Alley, 318 P.3d at_. The same is true in this 
case. If Ms. McKean were permitted to argue to the jury that AM-2201 was not a 
controlled substance, she could also assert a mistake of fact defense with regard to the 
other substances, JWH-210 and JWH-122, that were present in Fire N' Ice. The district 
court's holding removed with possibility from Ms. McKean. Thus, all of her convictions 
must be vacated. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence That Ms. McKean Relied On Reports 
Indicated That The Substances Were Not Synthetic Cannabinoids 
A. Introduction 
Ms. McKean asserts that the district court erred by excluding evidence of 
Ms. McKean's reliance on lab reports because they were relevant to the effect on the 
listenter. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the trial court's decision as to relevance, the standard of review is de 
novo. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 
Idaho 758, 766 (1993)). In reviewing the trial court's decision as to whether to exclude 
evidence pursuant to I.RE. 403, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence That Ms. McKean Relied on 
Reports Indicated That The Substances Were Not Synthetic Cannabinoids 
In this case, Ms. McKean obtained the various substances from internet 
websites. At trial, during the opening statements, counsel for Ms. McKean informed the 
jury that it would hear evidence that Ms. McKean received lab reports from these 
websites indicating that the products did not contain controlled substances. (Tr., Vol. 11, 
p.144, Ls.16-20.) The State objected, asserting that, "this is not even a veiled attempt 
by the Defense to defend on the basis of mistake of law." (Tr., Vol. 11, p.145, Ls.15-22.) 
Further, the State asserted that the reports would be inadmissible hearsay. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.146, Ls.1-4.) Ms. McKean asserted that the reports were not hearsay because they 
would not be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, the reports would 
be offered to show the effect on the listener. (Tr., Vol. II, p.146, Ls.13-21.) 
After much discussion, the district court read a report into the record from 
AIBioTech. It stated, 
Six herbal blend (Purple Diesel, KO, Atomic, Caution, Dark Knight, Mad 
Hatter.) By comparison with various reference standards, table 1, sample 
six herbal blend (Purple Diesel, KO, Atomic, Caution, Dark Knight, Mad 
Hatter) was found not to contain any synthetic cannabinoids, as 
designated in Florida HB39 section 2(1) paren zero or lower case 0, 40 
through 44, S1502 section 1 (1 )(c) 46-50 and 114-142, and HB1175 
section 1, 89303(6), 46-50 and 114-142. And there are a bunch of test 
results that list various synthetic cannabinoids. 
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(Tr., Vol. 11, p.160, L.23 - p.161, L.11 (emphasis added.)) After more discussion, the 
district court decided to exclude the reports, stating, 
These documents establish a mistake of law, i.e., the substance that I 
possessed was not a controlled substance. This goes to whether or not 
the substances are legal or illegal, not to what the substances are. And so 
the Court is going to exclude this on a mistake of law basis. 
The Court is further going to find that whether or not these are synthetic 
cannabinoids, as designated in Florida, again goes to determining whether 
or not in Florida these would constitute illegal substances. There is 
nothing that would be relevant as to her knowledge about whether or not 
these substances would be legal or illegal in Idaho, so there's nothing 
relevant about this document. Even to show its effect on the listener 
would only show that if Ms. McKean were in Florida, these might be legal 
substances. But that has nothing to do with what would be legal or illegal 
in the State of Idaho. 
And so the Court's going to find that it is irrelevant, and under the 
balancing, to introduce this would be more prejudicial than probative, 
because it's going to confuse the jury about the mistake of law and 
mistake of fact issues. 
(Tr., Vol. 11, p.167, L.4- p.168, L.4.) 
The district court revisited the issue on the next morning of trial. The court held 
that the reports were not relevant because it was clear that "testing was not done on the 
samples or the substances that Ms. McKean received." (Tr., Vol. 11, p.223, Ls.1-12.) 
Second, the list of substances tested was not exhaustive. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.224, Ls.1-2.) 
Third, they were not relevant because they dealt with Florida law. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.224, 
Ls.2-6.) Because the court found the reports not relevant, it held that it did not need to 
consider the effect on the listener; however, the concluded that the reports were "not a 
document on which she could rely, such that it would have an effect on the listener, 
because it very clearly does not apply to the samples that she obtained. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.225, Ls.1-4.) The court concluded that the report it had "does not in any way indicate 
that the samples that they received did or did not contain any synthetic cannabinoid." 
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(Tr., Vol. II p.225, Ls.5-14.) Finally, under a Rule 403 balancing test, the court 
concluded that the evidence would be confusing to the jury. (Tr., Vol. II p.225, Ls.15-
24.) Counsel then submitted a packet of the reports to the district court for purposes of 
the record. (Defendant's Exhibit A; Tr., Vol. II p.229, Ls.1-6.) 
Later, for purposes of making a record on appeal, Ms. McKean gave an offer of 
proof as to what she would have testified to regarding these reports. She testified that 
on May 1, 2012, she opened a shop called Smoke Effects in Caldwell. (Tr., Vol. 11, 
p.382, L.14 - p.383, L.9.) On April 26 or 27, 2012, she went to city hall to obtain a 
business permit; the business permit allowed her to open her store on May 1. (Tr., Vol. 
11, p.384, Ls.7-21.) Ms. McKean stated that she ordered her products over the internet; 
"Johnny Clearwater" was the first product that she obtained, afterward, she received 
other products such as "Scooby Snax, Mad Hatter, Down 2 Earth, [and] AK-47." 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.385, L.22 - p.386, L.24.) She obtained a product called "Fire N' Ice" from 
another website called salviaextracts.com. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.387, Ls.10-12.) 
Ms. McKean testified that she did not know that any of these products contained 
"synthetic drugs or synthetic cannabinoids or synthetic marijuana." (Tr., Vol. II, p.387, 
Ls.13-17.) She had never heard the term, "cannabinoid" prior to trial and if she had 
known the products contained synthetic marijuana or drugs she would never have 
ordered them. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.387, Ls.18-22.) She did not believe that the products 
contained synthetic drugs because, 
the websites that I went to told me - or it says right on them that they are 
50 state legal. They send you an email saying what's - the lab results that 
came with it that tell you what's in it and what's not in it, basically. And it -
and every order you get, you also get a hard copy in the package, same 
lab results, saying what's - what - what's not in it. 
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(Tr., Vol. II, p.388, Ls.17-25.) Ms. McKean testified that the products were for burning in 
a Scentsy container. (Tr., p.395, Ls.4-12.) She also testified that, because of the 
reports, she did not believe that she was in possession of any synthetic drugs. (Tr., Vol. 
II p.400, Ls.14-19.) Ms. McKean asserts that the district court erred because the 
reports are relevant to a mistake of fact defense; specifically, the effect on the listener. 
First, Ms. McKean never sought a mistake of law defense. Prior to trial, counsel 
stated, "I concede that when there's not a specific intent crime, there can be no mistake 
of law." (Tr., Vol. I, p.219, Ls.1-3.) Further, Ms. McKean did not object to the district 
court instructing the jury, after making his opening statement, that mistake of law was 
not defense. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.173, L.14 - p.175, L.18.)5 
Ms. McKean submits that the lab reports are relevant to show a mistake of fact -
namely, that she did not believe that she possessed synthetic cannabinoids. Part of the 
district court's holding - that Ms. McKean's knowledge of whether a substance is illegal 
is not relevant to a mistake of fact - is well taken. See State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 
(1993). This is a mistake of law and is not a defense. Id. 
However, "one might possess an illegal drug under the mistaken belief that it was 
a legal substance," and this mistake of fact, "if believed by the jury, requires an acquittal 
because the criminal intent element of the offense is not present." State v. Stefani, 142 
Idaho 698, 703 (Ct. App. 2005) ( citing State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 327, 242 ( 1999)). It 
was for this purpose that reliance on the lab reports was offered. 
The lab reports do more than state whether the substances were illegal in other 
jurisdictions. (See Defendant's Exhibit A.) Many of the reports indicate that the 
5 Counsel for Ms. McKean did object to giving a post-proof mistake of law, but only on 
the basis that a mistake of law defense was not presented at trial and, therefore, there 
was no evidence to support the instruction. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.430, Ls.20-25.) 
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company, Al BioTech, "makes no claims as to the legality of use of the test substance 
provided for analysis." (See, e.g., Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.217, 219, 221.) Thus, the 
lab reports were not (and could not) be submitted to demonstrate a mistake of law. 
However, the lab reports, in addition to stating that substances were not synthetic 
cannabinoids pursuant to Florida also, also provided a table listing which substances 
were not detected in the products. ( See, e.g., Defendant's Exhibi A at pp.220, 222, 
224.) Thus, the reports indicate that many synthetic cannabinoids are not detected in 
the samples. (See, e.g., Defendant's Exhibi A at pp.220, 222, 224.) Ms. McKean 
possessed reports indicated that substances such as "Scooby Snax" and "Mad Hatter 
Blueberry" did not contain an entire list of synthetic cannabinoids. (See, e.g., 
Defendant's Exhibit A, p.224.) 
Ms. McKean acknowledges that in order to prevail on the defense, a mistake of 
fact must be reasonable to be believed by a jury. And the State could certainly assert at 
the trial that reliance on the reports was unreasonable. That, however, is a question for 
the jury, not a question of admissibility. Thus, the district court's concerns that the 
testing was not done on the specific substances Ms. McKean received and was not 
exhaustive are relevant, but are not reasons to exclude the evidence. These concerns 
address the reasonableness of Ms. McKean's reliance, not that she did not or could not 
rely on them at all. Ms. McKean only sought to introduce the reports to establish a 
mistake of fact, namely Ms. McKean's belief that the products were not synthetic 
cannabinoids. The district court erred in concluding that the reports were relevant only 
to demonstrate a mistake of law and that Ms. McKean could not rely on them. 
Further the reports are not hearsay. "It is well established that out-of-court 
statements are not barred by the hearsay rule when offered to show their effect on the 
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listener." State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 540 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting McCormick on 
Evidence§ 249 (John W. Strong ed., 5th. Ed.1999) ("A statement that D made to Xis 
not subject to attack as hearsay when its purpose is to establish the state of mind 
thereby induced in X .... ")). In this case, the reports are not hearsay because their 
purpose was to establish the state of mind induced in Ms. McKean. Whether or not the 
statements in the reports are true is not significant - only the effect that the statements 
had on Ms. McKean is relevant. Ms. McKean was not attempting to establish as truth 
that the products were not synthetic cannabinoids. She was only seeking to establish 
that she did not believe that they were synthetic cannabinoids. Thus, the reports are 
not hearsay and the district court erred in concluding that they were. 
Finally, Ms. McKean asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
concluding that, pursuant to IRE 403, this evidence would be confusing to the jury. The 
decision to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202 (2006). When a trial court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, this Court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: 
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 600 (1989). 
While a district court has the discretion to exclude relevant evidence pursuant to 
IRE 403 if the evidence is confusing to the jury, Ms. McKean submits that the district 
court's conclusion that the jury would be confused was not reached by an exercise of 
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reason. The Court of Appeals has succinctly summarized the difference between a 
mistake of law and a mistake of fact: 
the individual might possess a substance knowing what it was, but 
unaware that it was classified as a controlled substance and that its 
possession was therefore unlawful. Such a mistake of law is not a 
defense. [State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993)]. Second, one might 
possess an illegal drug under the mistaken belief that it was a legal 
substance-for example possessing methamphetamine while truly believing 
that it was sugar. In such a case, the defendant's mistake of fact, if 
believed by the jury, requires an acquittal because the criminal intent 
element of the offense is not present. Blake, 133 Idaho at 242,985 P.2d at 
122; State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 178, 953 P.2d 614, 618 (1998) 
(Schroeder, J., specially concurring). 
State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 703 (Ct. App. 2005). Any confusion about 
Ms. McKean's reliance on the reports could be easily solved by simply instructing the 
jury that a mistake of law was not a defense but a mistake of fact was, if believed by the 
jury. Ms. McKean's argument concerning reliance on the reports is straightforward -
she asserted that she did not believe that she possessed synthetic drugs, she believed 
that she possessed potpourri for use in Scentsy candles. The fact that Ms. McKean 
received reports with tables indicating that a number of synthetic cannabinoids were not 
present in other samples tested is relevant to her state of mind. 
Thus, Ms. McKean asserts that the evidence concerning her reliance on the 
reports was relevant to show the effect on the listener and was not sought to establish a 
mistake of law. Because the district court incorrectly held otherwise, Ms. McKean's 
convictions must be vacated and her case reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. McKean requests that her convictions be vacated and her case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2014. 
M. CURTIS 
ate Appellate Public Defender 
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